14.3 C
Vancouver

RCMP Using Spyware In Foreign Interference Probes with Liberal’s Blessing but Without Privacy Oversight

Published:

Revelations about the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) using advanced spyware known as On-Device Investigation Tools (ODITs) have sparked intense debate, particularly regarding their use in foreign interference investigations. Originally reported by CBC News, the RCMP’s secretive deployment of these tools since 2017 has come under scrutiny, especially in high-profile cases like that of retired Mountie William Majcher, accused of working for Chinese interests. This article reexamines the issue, focusing on how ODITs have been used in such probes, drawing from credible sources to highlight the implications.

ODITs: A Silent Weapon in Foreign Interference Cases

The RCMP’s use of ODITs—software capable of infiltrating phones, laptops, and other devices to extract data or monitor communications—first gained public attention through an access-to-information request by Christopher Parsons, the Assistant Director of Technology Policy at the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. In the Majcher case, these tools were deployed not only against the primary suspect but also against two associates, including David MacNaughton, vice-president of the National Police Federation, due to the RCMP’s inability to access Majcher’s own device. This move underscores a broader strategy: when direct evidence is elusive, ODITs enable the RCMP to cast a wider net, targeting individuals tangentially linked to foreign interference suspects, in this case, two police officers – one current and one former – acting as witnesses.

RCMP Officer Pete Merrifield, one of the two witnesses who had their phones spied on by the RCMP but who were not suspects in the foreign interference case. Photo: National Police Federation.
RCMP Officer Pete Merrifield, one of the two witnesses who had their phones spied on by the RCMP but who were not suspects in the foreign interference case. Photo: National Police Federation.

Majcher, arrested in July 2023, faced charges under the Security of Information Act for allegedly aiding China towards the goal of foreign interference. The RCMP’s justification for using ODITs hinged on national security concerns, yet the lack of transparency about their application has fueled criticism.

A History of Secrecy

The RCMP admitted to using ODITs in 33 investigations since 2017, with 10 active cases as of early 2025, including foreign interference probes. Unlike traditional surveillance, which requires judicial oversight, the RCMP kept this program under wraps, neither informing the public nor consulting Canada’s federal privacy commissioner, though it unclear if judicial authorization was obtained in this case. This secrecy aligns with a global trend of law enforcement adopting commercial spyware—tools like Pegasus, developed by firms such as NSO Group—to combat sophisticated threats. However, in Canada, the absence of specific legislation governing the use of spyware for surveillance purposes has left a regulatory vacuum, amplifying concerns about accountability.

In the Majcher case, the RCMP’s use of ODITs was approved by a judge, but the broader policy remains opaque. Retired Vancouver police officer Mike Fenton, quoted in the original CBC article, warned that normalizing these tools erodes privacy rights and ethical boundaries, a sentiment echoed by critics who see parallels to authoritarian surveillance tactics.

Chris Parsons, PhD., the Assistant Director of Technology Policy at the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. Photo: Chris-Parsons.com.
Chris Parsons, PhD., the Assistant Director of Technology Policy at the office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario. Photo: Chris-Parsons.com.

Foreign Interference: A Justifiable Target?

Foreign interference has become a pressing issue in Canada, with allegations of Chinese influence in elections and diaspora communities prompting heightened RCMP scrutiny. A 2023 report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) highlighted such threats, and the Majcher investigation exemplifies the RCMP’s response. Unable to crack Majcher’s device, investigators turned to ODITs to extract data from the two officer/witness’s devices, hoping to uncover evidence of Majcher’s treason. This approach, while practical, raises questions about proportionality—especially when targeting individuals not directly accused of wrongdoing. This speculative deployment mirrors concerns raised in a 2022 Citizen Lab report on spyware, which cautioned that such tools often ensnare innocent parties in their dragnet.

Voices of Dissent

Within the RCMP itself, unease is growing. Constable Daniel Bulford, a sniper who resigned over vaccine mandates, and Fenton have publicly criticized ODITs as a breach of trust. Their concerns resonate with civil liberties advocates like the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, which has long argued that unchecked surveillance undermines democratic principles. In the context of foreign interference, where national security is pitted against individual rights, the RCMP’s reliance on ODITs risks alienating the very public it serves.

The Bigger Picture

Canada is not alone in grappling with spyware’s role in law enforcement. The U.S. and European nations have faced similar controversies, with the FBI’s use of Pegasus in criminal probes drawing parallels to the RCMP’s actions. Yet, Canada’s lag in establishing legal frameworks stands out as potentially unique in the developed world. A 2024 parliamentary review of national security tools recommended oversight for spyware, but as of April 2025, no such laws exist, leaving the RCMP’s ODIT program in a legislative gray area.

In foreign interference investigations, ODITs offer undeniable advantages—speed, depth of access, ability to activate microphone and camera features, onboard tools such as key logging, the ability to bypass software encryption such as that used by the Signal messaging app, and the ability to counter encrypted communications used by state actors. But their use against associates rather than prime suspects, as seen in the Majcher case, suggests a troubling escalation. Without clear guidelines, the RCMP risks transforming a tool meant to protect national security into one that widely threatens civil liberties.

The RCMP’s use of ODITs in foreign interference probes like Majcher’s reveals a double-edged sword: a powerful weapon against elusive threats, yet a potential Pandora’s box of privacy violations. As of April 9, 2025, the debate is far from settled. With no legislative guardrails and a history of secrecy, the RCMP’s approach invites skepticism—particularly when it targets individuals on the periphery of investigations. As Canada navigates the murky waters of foreign influence, the need for transparency and accountability has never been more urgent.

Related articles

spot_img

Recent articles

spot_img